

# **Decoupling in Massachusetts** September 28, 2007

Geoff Lubbock

Vice President, Financial Strategic Planning & Policy



# Decoupling

Decoupling eliminates the mismatch between environmental policy goals and utility ratemaking goals.

NSTAR Electric spent \$52 million in 2006 on energy efficiency programs.

# **Rates of Return – No analyst advantage**

"We have been impressed with the willingness of regulators to consider and authorize gas utilities weather normalization riders, performance-based rate freezes, bad-debt trackers and most recently conservation or 'decoupling' mechanisms without forcing gas utilities to undergo base rate cases that are expensive and put gas utilities in a bad public light ... the aforementioned rate mechanisms offer only modest protection against a generally rising operating cost environment."


-AG Edwards, January 2007

"LDCs that have, or soon expect to have RD [Revenue Decoupling] stand a better chance than others in being able to maintain their credit ratings or stabilize their credit outlook in face of adversity."

-Moody's, June 2006

# **Rates of Return – No market advantage**

Individual electric utilities' P/B ratios relative to a peer group average P/B ratio before and after announcement of decoupling approval<sup>1</sup>



#### Raab Associates Restructuring Roundtable

<sup>1</sup>The electric utility peer group is comprised of the 60 electric utility companies covered by Value Line. Price to Book data was obtained from the SNL database.

# **Rates of Return – No justification for a change**

- Analysts view decoupling as a means of maintaining the status quo in today's volatile utility environment
- Revenue decoupling does not guarantee profit or cash flow it only improves upon the existing mechanism for delivering Department-approved revenue
- In the Maryland cases, the utilities proposed a 25 basis point reduction in the utilities' return on equity but only after the proposed ROE had been increased by a 25 basis point adder.

### **DSM – Utility DSM administration is the preferred energy efficiency mechanism among leading states**

The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) publishes an annual scorecard ranking each state's energy efficiency programs. The most recent scorecard was published in June 2007, and <u>seven</u> of the top ten states used utility-administered DSM programs.<sup>1,2</sup>

Rank	State	DSM Admin
1	VT	Third Party
1	СТ	Utility
1	CA	Utility
4	MA	Utility
5	OR	Third Party
6	WA	Utility
7	NY	Third Party
8	NJ	Utility
9	RI	Utility
9	MN	Utility

In 2005 California shifted <u>back</u> to letting utilities administer DSM after five years of administration by the CPUC's Energy Division.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ACEEE, *The State Energy Efficiency Scorecard for 2006*, June 2007; report number E075

<sup>2</sup> US Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program (website)

<sup>3</sup> California Energy Commission, Implementing California's Loading Order for Electricity Resources, July 2005

# **DSM – Utility DSM administration is more effective than third party**

New York State offers a good comparison – a similar state with a different DSM administration model. It is clear that utilities are a better choice, for several reasons:

- Performance
- Relationships with customers
- In-place program infrastructure
- Less chance that energy efficiency funds will be re-allocated away from energy efficiency programs, as has already occurred in Maine, Ohio and Wisconsin<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Regulatory Assistance Project, Who Should Deliver Ratepayer Funded Energy Efficiency? May 2003

2005

5.200

0.260

616

\$

\$

200.000

**New York** 

\$138,000,000

6.200

0.267

1,190

116,000

Third Partv

Massachusetts

Utilities

Expenses \$ 123,100,000

Administration

\$/annual kWh saved \$

\$/annual kW saved \$

Lifetime Energy Savings (GWh)

Annual Demand Savings (kW)

### New rate cases – Unnecessary & costly step

- All current Massachusetts rate plans have been deemed just and reasonable by the Department
- NSTAR's recent settlement included full costs of service for its electric and gas utilities based on 2005 test year
- Conducting rate cases for all Massachusetts utilities would require 30 months at minimum
- Many existing rate plans specify a time period before the next rate case would be filed utilities have used this period of stability to enable long-range planning
- Regulatory instability is a key concern among security analysts and rating agencies

# Utility returns have been modest. Financially healthy utilities are needed for safe and reliable service

	Average ROE <sup>1</sup>
Mass Electric	11.0%
KeySpan	10.2%
Boston Edison	10.2%
Fitchburg Electric	9.7%
NSTAR Gas	9.1%
Bay State Gas	9.1%
Cambridge Electric	8.3%
Commonwealth Electric	8.1%
Berkshire Gas	6.5%
North Attleboro Gas	5.1%
Fitchburg Gas	4.8%
Fall River Gas	-0.9%



# **Costs subject to reconciliation – Not affected or replaced by decoupling**

- Decoupling addresses <u>revenue</u>; cost trackers address specific unpredictable <u>costs</u>.
- In all proceedings in which decoupling measures have been approved, existing cost tracker mechanisms were retained, and included with the newly-approved decoupling measure.



Summary – Decoupling eliminates the mismatch between environmental policy goals and utility ratemaking goals

- Without decoupling, utility energy efficiency is the same as *paying to reduce revenue*.
- Current rates of return remain reasonable & appropriate
- DSM programs should continue under utility management
- There is tremendous cost, and little potential value in conducting a new rate case prior to decoupling
- Decoupling does not eliminate the need for alreadyapproved cost-tracker mechanisms



# **Thank You**

- Questions???
- Additional information from:

Geoff Lubbock One NSTAR Way, NE240 Westwood, MA 02090 (781) 441-8669 Geoffrey.lubbock@nstar.com